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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the opportunities and threats which arise when turning 
origin/destination airports into hubs. The analysis focuses on market development 
trends, competitive structures—especially in the light of airline network strategies 
and the growing rivalry between airports—and finally the potential financial 
impacts for the airport, including both investment efforts and the financial results 
from hub operations. We argue that in most cases a decision against converting a 
traditional origin/destination airport into a major transfer point is preferable to the 
transformation into a hub.  
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The hub-and-spoke concept has remained a dominant characteristic of 
most scheduled airline networks since its introduction in the late 1970s, 
particularly for carriers integrated in global airline alliances.1 As a 
consequence, airports facilitating airline hub functions were able to increase 
their air traffic volumes significantly. Even though the market entry of low 
cost carriers has recently re-strengthened point-to-point links between non-
hub airports,2 Hub airports still dominate the global ranking of airports in all 
traffic categories (passengers, air cargo, aircraft movements).  
Driven by the competitive pressure on (formerly) protected national 
carriers to adapt to an increasingly competitive market environment, the hub-
and-spoke-system became a typical companion of the trend towards a 
liberalization of air transport. Consequently, hub-and-spoke networks are 
still increasing their geographic coverage now reaching more newly 
industrialized countries. The general character of hub airports has changed 
due to the fact that the total traffic figures of these countries are usually 
significantly lower than current focal hub-and-spoke markets like North 
America and Central Europe. The carriers operating from hubs are smaller 
(in terms of passengers transported, fleet size, etc.) compared to the 
traditional hub carriers in first world countries. Furthermore, the global 
airline alliances—oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance—have only partly 
sought co-operation or membership by carriers from developing countries. 
These carriers are either not yet able to guarantee the alliances’ quality 
requirements, or the respective national markets are already well served by 
existing alliance members. Therefore, at present fully functioning alliance 
hubs are a rarity in these regions.  
As part of the political process to liberalize the national aviation 
systems, governments of developing countries should consider two closely 
interlinked aspects: the future competitiveness of the national carriers as well 
as the operational and economic capabilities of the countries’ airports. The 
predominant centralization of the administrative and economic processes in 
these countries is also reflected in the structure of their national airport 
systems. The capital city airport is generally the operational base of the 
national carrier and the main gateway to international destinations, bundling 
the services of foreign airlines to and from this country. Consequently, it is 
normally the largest national airport in terms of air traffic handled. Integrated 
national aviation policies have to take this exposed function into account. A 
                                                 
1  On the importance of hubs for airlines and their marketing efforts see Dennis, 
1991. 
2  For a detailed analysis of the impact of low cost carriers on the development of 
airports see Dresner, Lin and Windle, 1996. 
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liberalization policy offers the opportunity of enhancing the airports’ 
capacity and performance as well as improving their market position.  
As the investment for this transition often exceeds the governments’ 
resources, privatizing the airport offers the achievement of international 
airport quality standards within a manageable timeframe. However, the 
market position of the airport on the supply side in terms of destinations, 
frequencies and airlines offered, can only be influenced indirectly by the 
airport.  
In the context of a long-term airport strategy governments often define a 
hub function as the key functional target for the central national airport. This 
expectation, which is often part of the airport privatization tender documents, 
has to be reflected in the light of the different stakeholders’ individual 
targets. As the airport only facilitates but does not operate the hub system, 
the importance of the airlines’ role becomes obvious. The question remains, 
whether this expectation is a valuable target for the airport as well.  
This paper analyzes the effects a hub function has on central capital 
airports in newly industrialized countries. We assume that airport operators 
strive towards achieving business success, whether the operating company is 
privatized or still remains under state ownership. For the purpose of this 
paper, the argument focuses on the passenger market segment. However, 
most of the aspects are also applicable to the air cargo business. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN AIRPORT FUNCTION: 
ORIGIN/DESTINATION AIRPORT VERSUS HUB AIRPORT 
In general, airports can be divided into two categories in commercial 
aviation: origin/destination (O&D) airports and hub airports. In the following 
chapter we will show why this strict separation does not reflect the full 
picture, since airports have to pass various evolutionary stages or 
development phases between being one of those two kinds of airports. To 
allow for this discussion, we first briefly discuss the typical characteristics of 
the traditionally distinguished airport types. 
The role of O&D airports is mainly defined as to act as the gateway to 
their region, offering an attractive point of entrance for visitors and a reliable 
point of departure for locals on their way abroad. O&D airports always 
require a sound traffic demand to allow for efficient and profitable 
operations. Connection traffic is of minor importance for these airports: 
Consequently, their infrastructure does not provide specific transfer 
facilities, and the national carrier has not established coordinated flight 
arrivals and departures to facilitate passenger itineraries which are not 
necessarily related to the respective airport region. Any transfer traffic at 
such airports is mainly limited to connecting small domestic airports with the 
international services and vice versa. O&D airports are the fundament of any 
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point-to-point air transport. Their focus is not to provide the more complex 
transfer operations, which are to a certain extent independent from the 
airport’s location. 
Airlines that have restructured their network on the basis of the hub-and-
spoke concept choose one airport—the hub—as their central point of 
transfer. Flights originating at the various cities in the carrier’s network 
(spoke airports) are consolidated and passengers wanting to travel between 
this airline’s non-hub airports are transferred within a specified timeframe. 
Thus, instead of providing a large number of direct connections between 
cities in the network, a far larger number of indirect connections with a 
transfer stop at the hub can be provided.3  
In this system, a so-called bank can ideally be defined by a wave of 
flight arrivals at the hub from numerous spoke airports during a limited 
timeframe. All aircraft utilized are on ground for a certain period of time to 
allow for the transit of passengers between flights. The airport’s specific 
minimum connecting time (MCT) defines the minimum period necessary to 
allow transfers from all arrivals to all departures and thus to ensure the full 
coverage of potential passenger itineraries.4 Once all transfers have been 
finalized, the aircraft leave the hub again within a limited period of time 
causing a second wave: the flight departures. 
This strict separation between hubs and O&D airports cannot reflect the 
whole range of airport functions in airline networks. On the one hand, like 
O&D airports, all hubs offer direct connections especially for the local 
passengers, leaving from the airport without using feeder flights. On the 
other hand, many O&D airports are trying to establish an initial hub position 
by attracting airlines and promoting transfers  
                                                 
3  The International Civil Aviation Organization uses the following definition for 
transit and direct transit passengers: “Direct transit passengers: Passengers who 
continue their journey on a flight having the same flight number as the flight on 
which they arrived. Passengers in direct transit are counted only once. Other transit 
passengers and stop-over passengers are counted twice: once as embarked passengers 
and once as disembarked passengers.” See ICAO Air Transport Reporting Form, 
Airport Traffic, Form I. Based on this definition, IATA is also referring to transit 
passengers in their airport charges manual. A more common definition, different 
from this official, approach names the other transit passengers as transfer passengers. 
See for example Doganis (2002), p. 339. In this paper, we follow the latter definition 
to avoid confusion with discussions in other papers. 
4  The MCT depends on the necessary processes involved in the transfer of 
passengers and their luggage. These not only include pertinent security checks of 
passengers and bags changing aircraft at the hub, but also immigration or customs. 
Furthermore, depending on the airport’s dimensions, a considerable amount of time is 
needed for the passengers to reach their departure gate and for the handling and 
sorting of their luggage. 
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Our discussion of the various airport and hub types is based on an 
analysis of current capacity supply profiles of selected airports being typical 
representatives of their respective types. These profiles show the available 
arriving and departing seat capacity both for the entire airport analyzed as 
well as for its hub airline or the strongest airline at the airport, respectively. 
The following charts show this profile for a typical day. On the x axis the 
hours of the day are shown, the y axis gives the available number of seats 
provided at any given time. Negative volumes represent capacities arriving 
at the airport, positive values are capacities departing from the airport.  
The charts have been derived through an analysis of the official flight 
schedule data for each airport for calendar week 10, 2006. In this process, 
the entire published flight schedule data including departure and arrival 
times as well as the available capacity per flight and the operating airlines 
has been analysed and clustered into 48 time periods of 30 minutes. This has 
resulted in the reflected total capacity supply in each interval.  
 
Origin/Destination (O&D) Airports 
Tunis-Carthage Airport (TUN) is an example for the first airport 
category, the typical O&D airport. 
Figure 1.  Typical capacity supply profile of an O&D airport: Tunis-Carthage Airport 


























Note. Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
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Tunis-Carthage Airport is the home base of Tunisian national carrier 
Tunisair. The airline is concentrating its entire network on its home base. 
This is not only reflected in the fact that almost the entire aircraft fleet 
employed is parked at Tunis overnight, resulting in significant departing 
capacities in the early morning hours and large capacities returning in the 
evening. Tunisair focuses on destinations which can be reached within 
approximately 2.5 hours flying time, which leads to a certain accumulation 
of flight activity during midday, when the entire fleet returns to Tunis before 
leaving again for the second rotations of the day. 
Other airlines than Tunisair have significantly lower market shares at the 
airport. Since most carriers operate routes of a similar stage length as 
Tunisair, but originate at the flag carrier’s destinations—mainly in Europe—
most of their flights arrive in the morning and return around noon.  
Besides these peaks, no major variations can be observed regarding the 
available capacity during the day. The capacities offered are usually in line 
with the demand experienced at the respective airport.  
The operational patterns of the airport as a whole and of Tunisair as the 
most important airline in terms of total seat capacity per day in Tunis do not 
show a clear indication of intended hub operations. These would be reflected 
by a stringent wave structure. 
O&D airports with first hub characteristics 
An example for an airport showing first hub characteristics is 
Johannesburg International Airport (JNB) in South Africa. Its major home 
base carrier South African Airways accounts for a significant share of the 
overall airport operations, but does not reach a clear dominance regarding 
the entire traffic at its base airport. Nevertheless major capacity demand 
differences between the peak utilization and the off-peak periods occur at 
Johannesburg. South African Airways only dominates the morning peak, the 
evening capacity peak is the result of several international airlines arriving 
and departing. The limited overall share of the home base carrier is also a 
result of the competition by other carriers in the liberalized domestic aviation 
market with its strong O&D traffic. 




Figure 2. Typical capacity supply profile of an O&D airport with first hub characteristics:  
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All airlines arriving












Note. Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Long-haul transfer hub airports 
Compared especially to the first example of Tunis-Carthage, but to a 
large extent also to the Johannesburg example airports mainly serving long-
haul routes represent a different typology in terms of their traffic pattern. 
Those routes tend to be served at a lower daily frequency than short- to mid-
haul routes and also depend on a number of specific long-haul travel 
parameters (time differences, night curfews, passenger departure/arrival time 
preferences, etc.). This results in an overall far more condensed operational 
pattern at the airports. These also show longer connecting times between the 
waves to allow the processing of the large number of passengers and their 
luggage. Typical examples for such airports are the new hub airports arising 
in the Middle East, which are the home bases of carriers strictly focusing on 
long-haul flights and competing for connecting traffic. 
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Figure 3.  Typical capacity supply profile of a long-haul transfer hub airport: Doha 


























Note. Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Qatar Airways, the home base operator at the Airport of Doha (DOH), 
accounts for almost the entire traffic at the airport, creating a strong 
dependence of the airport on the national carrier. Due to the airline’s strategy 
of serving and connecting mainly long-haul flights, there are only two peaks 
during the day, with the one close to midnight being absolutely dominant. 
This pattern results in extremely high capacity requirements during the hub 
bank period, while substantially less handling capacities are needed for the 
rest of the day. A very similar picture with even higher traffic volumes can 
be seen at Dubai Airport (DXB) with its home base carrier Emirates. 
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Figure 4.  Typical capacity supply profile of a long-haul transfer hub airport:  Dubai 


























Note. Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Hub airports of the Doha or Dubai type experience a daily traffic 
distribution leading to a highly utilized infrastructure only during the peaks. 
During the remaining time, a major share of the capacity provided remains 
under-utilized. Such a situation cannot be achieved by smaller airports, 
which do not have a major home base operator or have not established a 
strong competitive position as a transfer point. 
 
Mature hub airports 
At well-established hub airports a strong home base carrier operates 
several banks—up to 5 or 6 waves during the day-time, taking a total time of 
about 1.5-2.0 hours each. This leads to a situation in which the single peak 
periods follow each other at close intervals and thus generate a relatively 
stable level of infrastructure utilization, interrupted only by short periods of 
lower traffic loads. It has to be realized that even within the group of fully 
developed hub airports differences in the operational patterns and thus in the 
degree of infrastructure utilization can be observed. Paris-Charles de Gaulle 
(CDG) is a typical example of a mature hub airport with a combination of 
short- and long-haul traffic. 
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Figure 5:  Typical capacity supply profile of a mature hub airport: Paris–Charles de 


























Source: Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Paris-Charles de Gaulle is one of the largest hub airports in Europe, 
being the home base of the French national airline Air France. It is also one 
of the very few large European hub airports still providing sufficient space 
for further expansion. The operational pattern shown in figure 5 reflects the 
typical traffic situation for a highly frequented hub airport. There are five 
very sharp peaks almost equally distributed over the day, with large 
capacities arriving at the airport and departing shortly afterwards. In the 
evening, there are only two minor additional peaks. These are not as strong 
as the first peaks, but can still be well recognized. The home base operator, 
Air France not only operates the majority of the shown aircraft capacities 
and thus dominates the overall development of the airport. Air France also 
determines the traffic peak pattern with its supply. 
 
Hub airports with de-peaking strategy / Rolling hubs 
Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) reflects a further evolutionary stage of hub 
airports with a so-called rolling hub structure. 
Similar to Paris, a single airline, in this case American Airlines, clearly 
dominates the overall air traffic supply. Apparently this is mainly done using 
a hub concept, but based on a total of about eight waves per day. Due to the 
high number of wave operations, only minor variations between the peaks 
and the short off-peak periods occur. This is the result of a de-peaking 
concept, which tries to reduce extreme peaks and increases the permanent 
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utilization of the airport. At large airports, this is possible by moving flights 
to less congested times, resulting in a more even distribution over the day. In 
the case of Dallas/Fort Worth this is accompanied by coordinating eastbound 
and westbound waves allowing fast and reliable connections for 
transcontinental traffic. Furthermore, along with the increasing number of 
flights the number of connections to most destinations has increased as well. 
This allows for transferring from one incoming flight to several outgoing 
flights, which leads to an erosion of the clear wave structures and eases the 
peaks. 
Figure 6.  Typical capacity supply profile of a rolling hub airport with de-peaking 


























Source: Based on airline schedule data (calendar week 10, 2006), OAG 2006 
 
Before such a change in the operational pattern is possible, a hub needs 
to reach a certain development stage. Only well-established hub airports, 
which serve a large variety of markets and extremely large passenger 
volumes, show as high a number of waves as the examples given. Usually, 
these hubs serve both short- and long-haul flights as well as continental and 
intercontinental traffic. 
 
The hub airport’s evolutionary stages 
Summarizing the results of these analyses a total of five different airport 
types can be distinguished. The first is the traditional O&D airport, serving 
its region without a clearly observable hub transfer service pattern (e.g., 
Tunis-Carthage). The second airport type only partly targets transfer traffic 
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flows, but has a home base operator operating only one bank in the morning. 
This peak might be accompanied by a second peak in the evening, resulting 
from the same-time operation of several international carriers (e.g., 
Johannesburg). 
The first clearly identifiable hub airport type describes airports with 
strong home base operators focusing on the transfer of passengers between 
long-haul flights. These airports experience one or two banks per day, 
resulting in strong peaks and relatively stable, but significantly lower traffic 
volumes over the day (e.g., Doha and Dubai). Finally, a fully developed hub 
airport combines multiple waves over the day, in which short- to medium-
haul flights are connect with long-haul flights and vice versa. There are two 
possible development stages. The first can be observed at large hubs still 
offering open capacity reserves, showing substantially lower traffic in the 
off-peak periods (e.g., Paris–Charles de Gaulle). The other is the category of 
congested mega-hubs, at which the airlines have already started to introduce 
de-peaking to lower the peak utilization by rescheduling flights into off-peak 
times, resulting in a balance in the use of infrastructure (e.g., Dallas/Fort 
Worth). 
These evolutionary stages of airport development can be identified at 
every airport worldwide. Even though airports are increasingly active in 
developing their own business by attracting airlines through various means 
of airport marketing and air service development,5 it has to be realized, that 
airports do not provide hub operations themselves. It is—and will remain—
the airline that decides whether to establish hub operations at a given 
location. Any initiative of an airport driven transfer strategy remains at a 
very low level, because airports can only cover a minor share of the financial 
risk of providing air services. Thus, for any functional development an 
airport is highly dependent on its most important customers—the airlines—
particularly the home base operator. Therefore providing facilities at an 
airport, which are designed to facilitate hub operations is always a risky 
endeavour, opening great opportunities as well as risks for the success of the 
airport. As long as the hub operations of the home airline flourish, the airport 
will also prosper, due to the constantly growing traffic volumes. Should 
there be major changes in the carrier’s network strategy or should the airline 
go bankrupt, this situation can pose a threat to the airport. 
Recent examples of the discontinuation of a positive traffic development 
at hub airports have emphasized the risk the dependency on one carrier bears 
for an airport. The airport operation is increasingly at risk, the more 
specialized the hub function, the lower the share of the local O&D traffic and 
the higher the passenger share of the hub carrier. 
                                                 
5   See, for example, Jarach (2005). 
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Especially during crisis periods—which are experienced quite 
frequently in the volatile aviation industry—airlines have to react by 
significant cost-cutting measures at short notice. Airports can suffer 
substantially from this situation if a multi-hub carrier decides to scale down 
its network. A remarkable example was the closure of American Airlines’ 
hub at Raleigh/Durham Airport, North Carolina, in 1995. Airport facilities 
highly specialized for the hub function lost their main mission, leaving the 
airport with over-dimensioned, under-utilized facilities generating high fixed 
costs.  
Zurich and Brussels airports have experienced similar situations as a 
consequence of their respective hub carriers’ financial instability. Both have 
constructed major hub terminals for their home base carriers, Swissair and 
Sabena. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, both carriers went 
bankrupt within weeks. By that time the construction works were already at 
an advanced stage. As a consequence, both airports had to finalize the 
facilities, continuing to invest substantial amounts in their terminals. To limit 
further losses resulting from the lack of traffic, both airports decided to close 
down the completed facilities to at least save operational costs for the time 
being. Thus, the terminals were not used until a sufficient number of other 
carriers had taken the opportunity to fill the gaps left by the former hub 
carriers at least by serving the strong passenger O&D demand at the two 
cities. Parts of the older terminals were closed after the new facilities 
opened. Both airports lost their specific hub status and a high share of 
connecting traffic, but the O&D demand was still served. 
COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF HUB DEVELOPMENT  
To evaluate the implications of hub operations on an airport from an 
economic or financial perspective, first the underlying basis for any hub 
development needs to be analyzed. Due to the main characteristics of any 
hub—established and operated by an airline, but requiring major investments 
and operational changes from the chosen airport as infrastructure and service 
provider—the goals of both parties involved should be discussed when 
establishing a hub. While the goals are identical or at least complimentary in 
some regards, there are some contradicting targets, which need to be dealt 
with—even though for both parties the main goal of course is a 
maximization of traffic and revenues. 
For the airline, network attractiveness is achieved by providing as many 
connections between as many airports as possible at an efficient and 
profitable level at the lowest achievable cost base. Before the late 1970s the 
standard operational pattern was to link two airports with direct services, 
thus providing non-stop services even on routes offering only a comparably 
low demand. The result of this strategy is the need for a very large aircraft 
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fleet to be able to serve all relevant routes. Furthermore, this fleet must 
consist either of aircraft with very different capacities to serve every market 
adequately, or low seat load factors on some routes and an under-satisfied 
demand on other markets have to be accepted. Both approaches result in 
high direct costs by operating an inflexible and inadequate aircraft fleet or by 
accounting for high opportunity costs caused by not serving existing 
demands. Either strategy has proved to be a sub-optimal business model.6 
Therefore, airlines have started consolidating traffic flows at single points, 
their hubs, to be able to offer flights with a high demand using larger aircraft 
at lower per seat costs while still serving other destinations with direct 
flights. Along with these operational targets another goal is of course to 
establish a strong customer position with the hub airport, enabling the airline 
to negotiate discounts or other benefits. 
A major disadvantage of the hub concept from the passengers’ point of 
view is the transfer procedure itself. Passengers have to change aircraft at an 
airport they did not intend going to and by doing so they need even more 
time to reach their final destination compared to direct services. To minimize 
total travel times as far as possible, airlines need to reduce the time required 
for transferring at their hub. In the global distribution systems (GDS), 
itineraries are always ranked by elapsed travel time. Therefore, airlines with 
inefficient hubs requiring long connecting times are ranked relatively low in 
the GDS. Since approximately 90% of all bookings are made from the first 
screen of the GDS, such a constellation results in substantial competitive 
disadvantages and thus translates into a direct loss of revenues.  
For an airline a hub is not only the transfer point of its passengers. 
Besides the in-flight service it is the best place to cater to their customers’ 
other service requirements. The hub airport is always the ideal location to 
offer dedicated additional services to the high value passengers, namely 
frequent travellers, business and first class passengers. These range from 
lounges and special assistance services to dedicated terminals and transport 
services between the terminal and the aircraft—either with dedicated buses 
or even luxury limousines. 
                                                 
6  While this statement is valid for the traditional network carriers whose target is to 
serve a wide portfolio of destinations, regions and passengers, low cost carriers 
strictly adapt to the point-to-point network structure. Establishing and operating a 
hub-and-spoke network is a very complex and costly issue, whereas low cost carriers 
are strictly focusing on reducing costs. This is achieved by many different means, 
including network simplicity. Transit opportunities are not offered to the passengers, 
there is no time coordination between the single flights. Thus, the following 
discussions exclude the low cost market segment, even though these carriers are 
taking over an increasing share of the market. They do not play a relevant role in hub 
development. 
 Kraus and Koch 101 
 
 
While for the airline the main target is to offer a high product quality at 
the hub at low costs, for the airport operator the goals differ significantly. 
The common goals of both parties are passenger services, customer loyalty 
as well as an overall efficient and thus cost reducing operation. At the same 
time, the targets of operating profitably and maximizing revenues for the 
airport require completely different approaches in the context of hub 
development. Airlines endeavour to keep their passengers on the ground for 
as short a time period as possible, which is counterproductive to the airports’ 
target to maximize retail revenues, as passengers hurrying to their 
connecting flight do not have sufficient time to allow for extensive shopping.  
Furthermore, airports naturally strive for a continuously high utilization 
of their infrastructure. Airports are increasingly reluctant to discount charges 
for the hub airline and show a growing interest in attracting other airline 
customers to exploit the available business opportunities. The exclusivity 
targeted by the hub carrier is of course not supported by such a strategy. 
Several additional arguments have a high impact on an airline’s hub 
choice and development. Driven by the still rather regulated aviation system 
the main hub of any carrier can only be located in its home country—
resulting from the availability of traffic rights which usually depend on the 
carriers’ nationalities. Thus, any country without a strong national carrier 
faces severe difficulties in establishing a strong hub.  
Apart from regulative and political reasons various additional influences 
have an impact on a successful hub development. The first is the airport’s 
geographic location. If a hub is intended to bring any advantage to the 
passengers, who ultimately decide on the hub operations’ success, a major 
factor is the lowest possible total travel time even when using the hub. This 
requires a hub location as close to the direct line between origin and 
destination as possible to minimize the flying time for feeder flights.7 Distant 
locations, far from the main routes, are considered disadvantageous and 
cannot be compensated by other competitive means. In this respect it is 
important to distinguish between intercontinental hubs and continental hubs. 
Continental hubs located far away from the heart of the continent tend to be 
suboptimal, for intercontinental hubs the position close to the most utilized 
intercontinental routes is the main decision factor. 
Topographic aspects generally add to the geographical arguments in 
evaluating the hub potential of an airport. Airport locations significantly 
above sea level surrounded by mountains or experiencing extremely high 
                                                 
7  A network simulation model like applied by Berechman and de Wit (1996) for the 
deregulated European market can contribute to the theoretical choice of the hub 
location. However, this approach is of limited value for most developing countries as 
the system of bilateral air service agreements restricts the free choice of routes served 
by the airlines. 
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temperatures bear operational disadvantages especially for long-haul flights, 
since all these features might result in payload restrictions or similar 
operational limitations for the airlines. While these aspects are also relevant 
for certain direct flights, for example, flights between Europe and certain 
South American destinations, they can be accepted for single flights. If a 
complete hub operation has to be set up under such restrictions, negative 
operational factors lead to an overall situation that is not suited to handling 
the complexity of an airport hub operation. 
Besides the operational aspects discussed, competition issues have 
developed as the most crucial influential factors in turning O&D airports into 
hubs.8 The decision to realize this development is usually driven by three 
main targets. First, the airport targets at developing a preferred position in 
the greater region, achieving the status of largest facility in the market and 
the focal point of future air transport development. Particularly economic 
expectations are the main drivers of such a strategy. Second, air transport 
generates economic development and trade flows. The hub for the region has 
a potential position to become the most important trade centre at which the 
trade and travel routes of the region meet. This creates opportunities for an 
increasing economic development of the airport’s surrounding area—for 
example, in the form of logistics parks or a free trade zone—and of course 
for the airport itself.9 Third, the political dimension of having a hub airport is 
one of the most important development drivers, since it is expected to give 
the country and thus the government a leading role in the region. 
All these expectations are closely related to the original hub function. 
Increasing air traffic, as related to a hub development, implies new revenues 
and commercial potential for an airport operator. Additionally, the economic 
impact of air transportation on a country’s industry, trade and tourism are 
well proven. Furthermore, the political dimension of becoming the trade 
centre of a region should not be underestimated. This constellation’s core 
problem is that the benefits expected by developing a hub are far too 
promising to be ignored by any airport in a region without a dominant 
airport. Thus, usually several O&D airports try to take over the leader’s 
position at the same time. This directly results in intense competition 
between several relatively weak candidates, often ignoring the operational 
aspects discussed above. This type of situation can currently be observed in 
Central South America with airports like Lima, Bogotá, Guayaquil and 
Caracas all competing to become a main hub for the continent. While all four 
airports are trying to attract more traffic and to support transfer structures, 
                                                 
8  A deeper discussion of the effects of liberalization developments on airports in the 
European Union can be found in Barrett (2000) or Starkie (2002). 
9  For an evaluation of the economic welfare effects of airports, especially in the case 
of their development by airline alliances, see Park, 1997. 
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they compete intensively by improving, expanding and marketing their 
airport infrastructure. None of them have strong interregional home base 
operators able to support such a development so far.  
A similar kind of competition can be observed in other parts of the 
world, even between larger airports such as Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 
both competing for the same transfer market, or several airports in the Pearl 
River Delta, including Hong Kong and Guangzhou. 
Besides adding to their own, existing infrastructure by undertaking 
multi-million or even multi-billion dollar investments, the competing 
airports use every other available means of competition as well. These range 
from reducing overall landing fees and handling charges for all airlines, to 
special marketing and incentive programs for selected airlines, which for 
example introduce intercontinental services or establish transfer-focused 
operations. Besides the direct financial impact on the airport’s performance, 
which will be discussed in the following, the dramatic competitive aspects 
should be regarded as well, creating a situation in which deregulation might 
lead to destructive competition. 
The competitive dynamics of such a constellation can be shown with 
simple theoretical considerations. Two airports with the choice between 
establishing a hub or not, can be presented in a simple, two-dimensional 
matrix. For both airports, this matrix allows the choice of either an O&D or a 
hub function.  
Now consider a move by any one airport towards establishing a hub. 
There will be a competitive reply by the other airport, resulting in reduced 
revenues for both airports as well as high investment and operational costs. 
We assume that in the case of no change for both airports (both remain O&D 
airports) the business performance will not change for the two players. If 
now any one of the two players chooses to become a hub, this will have two 
impacts. On the one hand, this will lead to an improved economic situation 
for the active player, taking advantage of the new market position. On the 
other hand the competitor will lose traffic and thus experience negative 
impacts. Therefore both players will strive for the position as the first mover, 
since a position as the only hub is preferential to remaining an O&D airport. 
This results in a situation in which both parties establish hub operations at 
high costs, competing at a level which eliminates the positive effects for 
both. The situation for the remaining O&D airport is even in danger of a 
further deterioration as other airlines might shift long-range direct flights to 
the hub airport and only operate spoke feeder flights to the O&D airport. 
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In this simple scenario an overall positive outcome (following any 
change) is impossible. Furthermore, the financial risks in setting up a hub 
operation are neglected irrespective of new competitive patterns. In the 
following, this financial perspective is discussed more closely. 
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A HUB STRUCTURE FOR 
AIRPORTS 
Hub operations are specifically characterized by an extremely intensive 
utilization of airport infrastructure in a short period of time. The underlying 
concept of providing a high number of transfer opportunities to a multitude 
of destinations leads to significant operational peaks for all elements of the 
airport and the aviation infrastructure at the hub location. Air traffic control 
capacities have to satisfy these demands. Furthermore, runway and taxiway 
systems, apron space, fuel farm reservoirs, passenger terminals and cargo 
facilities have to be provided in line with demand. This may also result in 
further requirements for landside facilities such as the access roads to the 
airport, depending on the share of passengers using the transfer airport as an 
origin or destination airport. This leads to the problem of significant capital 
investments in infrastructure, which is only utilized during the peak times.  
In 2004, the member airports of Airport Council International together 
spent about US$ 30 billion in infrastructure projects.10 This figure underlines 
the high investment costs needed for the upgrading of existing airports to 
                                                 
10  See Airport Council International (2005). 
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cope with the traffic developments and to prepare the airports for the future. 
Of course, the measures taken and the costs of such development projects 
differ significantly depending on the location of the existing airport, its 
current size and the objective of the project. Nevertheless, any terminal 
construction or even building a new airport to replace the existing 
facilities—usually because the current airport cannot be developed further at 
its present location—requires substantial investments. The following table 
gives some examples for recent new terminal or airport development projects 
in different parts of the world. The significantly higher investment costs for 
projects focusing on hub facilities compared to destination airport facilities 
are apparent. 
Table 1. Investment costs for airport expansion or development projects, 2006 
Airport Investment Cost Kind of Project Hub focus? 
Munich, Germany US$ 1.8 billion New terminal including apron Yes 
Frankfurt, Germany US$ 4.1 billion New terminal including new runway Yes 
Lima, Peru US$ 1.2 billion Terminal expansion Yes 
Manila, Philippines US$ 650 million New terminal Limited 
Bangalore, India US$ 180 million Greenfield airport Limited 
Guayaquil, Ecuador US$ 250 million Greenfield airport No 
Ouagadougou,  
Burkina Faso US$ 230 million Greenfield airport No 
Source: own depiction 
 
In addition to the facilities required for successful hub operations, major 
investments also have to be made into the mobile equipment such as 
passenger stairways or trucks and, of course, in qualified personnel to 
operate and handle the airport, the aircraft and the passengers and goods. In 
addition to the sheer air traffic volumes to be handled during the peaks, 
transfer operations require special processes and technical installations, for 
example, a central baggage handling and sorting system or dedicated, 
separate transfer areas for the passengers, who in many cases are not allowed 
to mix with departing or arriving passengers before reaching their respective 
departure gates. The larger the hub operations, the more complex processes, 
systems or terminal areas. These factors lead to high investments and rising 
operational costs. Operational costs include salaries for additional staff, the 
maintenance costs for facilities and equipment, energy costs, insurance costs 
and a multitude of further cost-related items.  
For a financial evaluation of the advantages of hub operations both the 
start-up investments as well as the operational costs need to be considered in 
detail. All these items have to be regarded as fixed costs. It is neither 
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possible to operate the terminal and other infrastructure units only during the 
peak periods, nor to have the necessary staff available only for selected 
hours of the day. Therefore any under-utilization of the airport leads to an 
inefficient use of the available resources. Significant opportunity costs are 
incurred, where the money spent on providing over-capacities could 
otherwise be used for alternative business developments. 
A major underlying problem of hub operations are the different, 
diverging interests of the various partners involved. Airlines following a 
hub-and-spoke network strategy focus all their planning and operation on the 
minimization of the aircraft time on the ground and the maximization of the 
number of connections offered during this time. Successful operations at 
their hub require as little time as possible. Utilizing the airport off the waves 
is comparably unattractive for the respective airline, despite a limited 
number of direct connections only serving local O&D traffic. At the same 
time, reducing costs is a main driver for all business decisions. Keeping 
operating costs and of course airport charges to a minimum is a top priority.  
For airports on the other hand, hub operations result in a far more 
complex and difficult situation. Airlines pay for the use of the provided 
infrastructure and services offered by the means of landing fees or passenger 
service charges. Thus, the costs incurred during the off-peak times through 
maintaining the peak-time capacities have to be covered by other means—
sufficiently higher charges during the peak-times to subsidize off-peak 
periods are usually not accepted by the airlines. This effect, combined with a 
continuous attempt to lower the common aviation charges has led to the 
rising importance of non-aeronautical revenues for airport operators.11 While 
general assumptions claim that about 50% of total revenues at airport 
companies are already generated though non-aeronautical, commercial 
activities, the share aviation revenues account for is expected to further 
decrease over the next years. Even today, large airports such as Los Angeles 
International, San Francisco International, Frankfurt or Munich already earn 
between one-third and two-thirds of their revenues by non-aeronautical 
activities. Table 2 shows current revenue splits for a selection of 
international hub and non-hub airports as well as for several airports with 
only minor hub operations. 
While the changing revenue structure shows that airports have learnt to 
diversify their business and started to develop a certain independence from 
the air traffic development at their facilities, the hidden threats to hub 
airports also become apparent. Obviously the revenues from landing fees and 
passenger service charges will rise with an increase in air traffic, which is the 
                                                 
11  Francis, Fidato and Humphreys (2003) discuss the issue of airport revenues and 
the potential conflicts of interest along two case studies of low cost carriers and their 
impact on airports.  
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core of every hub operation. This general observation still leads to a purely 
positive evaluation of setting up hub operations, since these bring both air 
transport and passenger movements on a large scale. However, it does not 
directly reveal the competitive and operational downsides of such a traffic 
pattern as shown in the above table. Aeronautical revenues become less 
important when hub operations gain momentum, literally forcing the airport 
to compensate their high investment and operations costs with another non-
aeronautical income. 
Table 2. Revenue split for selected airport operators, 2006 
Airport Hub status? 
Share of aeronautical 
revenues 
Share of commercial 
revenues 
Frankfurt 
International Yes 40% 60% 
Singapore Changi Yes < 40% >60% 
London Heathrow 
(BAA) Yes approx. 40% approx. 60% 
Los Angeles World 
Airports Partly 62%* 38% 
San Francisco 
International Partly 67% 33% 
Toronto Partly 59% 41% 
Hamburg No 65% 35% 
Stuttgart No 67% 33% 
* including building rentals 
Source: own depiction 
 
As discussed in the light of competitive aspects, in most regions of the 
world there are either well-established hub airports already holding a strong 
market position or there is a group of airports simultaneously competing for 
the preferred hub location. The quality of facilities and services provided as 
well as the charges due for the airlines are of major competitive importance. 
While the airports’ services tend to increase in volume and quality, the 
charges are systematically lowered in an attempt to attract airlines. 
Therefore, the positive financial effect of additional traffic tends to be 
diminished by the competitive measures facilitating the traffic growth.  
At the same time, former monopolies, for example, ground handling 
services are being increasingly liberalized, leading to greater or new 
competition for the airport operators even within their own operations. This 
again leads to the effect of being forced to reduce charges and to increase the 
service quality offered. 
In total, the effects of hub operations which are originally regarded as 
positive aspects have to be re-evaluated as very limited or non-existent. This 
situation mainly applies to newly developing hub airports. Well-established 
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major hubs with an accordingly strong market and competitive positions 
have usually solved these problems. 
In addition to the discussed leveraging effect two additional factors have 
to be closely regarded in evaluating the financial side of turning an airport 
into a hub: passenger charges and commercial revenues. 
Passenger charges at airports are levied to compensate the airport for its 
services in the context of providing passenger and baggage handling, ranging 
from check-in services, security controls, and baggage screening to the 
transport of passengers and luggage to the aircraft. Since most of these 
activities take place on the landside of the terminal and thus before the 
passenger enters the airside, the complexity and volume of services for 
departing passengers are the highest. For transfer passengers, the most 
important target group of hub operations, the majority of these activities are 
not needed since they have already passed security, very often even 
immigration and customs before leaving their origin airport. Thus, the 
passenger service charges for transfer passengers are usually significantly 
lower than for departing passengers, which again reduces the financial 
benefits for the airport operator. The following table gives an impression of 
passenger service charges at selected airports worldwide for both departing 
and transfer passengers. 
Table 3. Passenger service charges at selected airports, April 2005 






Frankfurt € 12.15 – € 17.10 € 10.00 18% – 42% 
Munich € 9.86 – € 12.08 € 7.69 – € 9.42 22% 
Düsseldorf € 9.90 – € 11.78 € 8.80 11% – 25% 
Paris–Charles de 
Gaulle € 4.19 – € 12.10 € 3.64 – € 9.08 13% – 25% 
Dubai AED 30.00 None 100% 
Doha QAR 30.00 None 100% 
Singapore SGD 15.00 None 100% 
USA international 
airports USD 14.10 USD 14.10 0% 
Tunisia € 4.50 – € 6.00 None 100% 
Lima USD 5.04 – USD 28.24 None 100% 
Nairobi USD 40.00 None 100% 
Note: Data from Airport and Air Navigation Charges, by International Air Transport 
Association, April 2005. 
 
The lower the aeronautical revenues, the more important the non-
aeronautical revenues become for the healthy business development of any 
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airport operator. While there are almost unlimited opportunities for airports 
to generate commercial revenues, the most profitable activities are usually 
the operation of parking spaces, concessions and retail activities. Parking is 
only needed by departing and arriving passengers and thus does not offer 
significant revenue generation potentials for hub airports. The same applies 
to many concessionaires’ businesses, for example, car rentals or currency 
exchange bureaus.  
Retail activities are mainly used by passengers who have already passed 
the security line and are on the airside. Having reached that point, the 
passengers use the waiting time to entertain themselves with shopping or 
dining, for example. The retail business of airports therefore benefits from a 
maximum idle time for the passengers. This of course is the direct opposite 
of what an airline expects from its hub airport, that is, the shortest possible 
minimum connecting time. If the passengers have only a very limited time to 
change aircraft they do not have enough time or at least feel that they do not 
have enough time to take advantage of the commercial attractions at the 
airport. This leads to a situation in which increasing operational efficiency 
and speed of the hub operations cause a significant decrease in commercial 
revenues. 
A final aspect with significant impact on the economic success of hub 
operations for an airport is the required terminal space. Hub operations 
process large numbers of passengers and baggage at the same time. To 
handle these traffic flows adequately, terminal areas free of hindrances or 
installations to disturb the traffic flow are needed, providing an efficient 
operation. However, due to the need to finance the hub development through 
non-aeronautical revenues, the commercial areas need to be as large as 
possible. Since these areas should not interfere with the operational 
processes, even more space is required leading to additional investments and 
operational costs. 
The financial impacts of turning a destination airport into a hub airport 
should be evaluated very carefully in each individual case. Well-established 
hub airports have found ways to generate sufficient revenues from their hub 
operations, even though they need to provide large capacities. In the first 
step this requires very high investment costs for new hub airports which 
furthermore lead to significant operational costs once the facilities are in 
place. The more efficiently the processes at the airport can be designed and 
realized, the less the airport will earn with hub operations, making the 
financial result of the development a rather risky undertaking. 
CONCLUSION 
Hubs are the focal points of today’s aviation business. The growing 
importance of low cost carriers and their network strategies have increased 
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the number of point-to-point services in most parts of the world. However, 
the concept of consolidating traffic at major airports will remain the 
dominant approach in the foreseeable future.12 Therefore the general interest 
in achieving a hub status will continue to remain an attractive target.  
Most global markets already have well-established hub airports, which 
have gained dominant positions for their respective niches e.g. hubs for 
regional services or in the intercontinental market. The differences between 
these hub types have to be taken into account in all evaluations of the 
opportunities for a successful airport development. There are only a few 
white spots left where so far no airport has been successful in taking over the 
leadership role. In regions like parts of South America, Africa or even South-
East Asia, many airports intend to establish such a position. 
Our arguments have shown the typical development stages of airports, 
growing from typical O&D airports into hub airports. We have also 
described the competitive reactions to the strategic decision to transform an 
airport into a hub by surrounding competitors and have pointed out the 
financial risks in this undertaking. 
In summary the following factors evolve as the crucial decision points 
for such a development. 
1. From a financial point of view, operating an efficient and reliable 
O&D airport is far more beneficial than setting up a hub airport. Hub 
facilities require large facilities, needing high investments and 
generating increased operating costs. At the same time, aviation charges, 
especially passenger service charges, tend to decrease for transfer 
traffic, forcing the airport to generate revenues from other sources. 
Commercial revenues tend to be difficult to improve, due to the very 
limited time transfer passengers spend in the terminal. 
2. A suitable geographical location is a prerequisite for an airport 
being chosen by an airline as a transfer point. A home base operator is 
necessary, since no other carrier usually has sufficient market presence 
to operate a real hub at a foreign airport.13 A hub needs to be situated at 
a location which does not result in major additional flying time for 
airlines and passengers. 
3. Any airport trying to establish a hub has to face severe competition 
by surrounding airports that are not willing to lose market share to their 
                                                 
12   This development is supported by the introduction of very large new aircraft like 
the A380 and the B747-8. Nevertheless, there will be a growing market for direct 
services on routes with larger demand—the market for which the B787 and the A350 
are designed for. 
13   One of the very few examples is the airport of Singapore, at which Qantas of 
Australia operates a type of hub operation, having co-ordinated all their flights 
between Europe and Australia to allow for transfers. 
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neighbour or to give up their own position as gateway to their region. 
Competition will most probably result in decreasing revenues due to 
reduced aviation charges. 
4. Closely related to the hub status is a strong dependence of the 
airport on a single carrier. If this carrier takes the strategic decision to 
close or relocate the hub or if the hub airline goes bankrupt, the airport 
faces a severe economic threat, which leaves it with substantial 
problems and costs. 
 
It is always a risky decision to promote a change of the current function 
of an airport into a hub facility. Economic and financial success can of 
course be achieved, but need a long and consistent development. During this 
phase, severe competition has to be fought, requiring sufficient financial 
reserves to cover that period. Even then there is no guarantee for success in 
the intended venture. 
Airports working on establishing a hub position do not have to watch 
competition passively. The fields of airport marketing and air service 
development offer significant potential to support the airport’s development. 
They mainly include promotion and incentive programs to attract carriers to 
expand existing services or to introduce new ones to the airport. Of course 
those measures cannot guarantee a successful hub development. The future 
always depends on the airlines’ and their passengers’ decisions. 
As soon as the hub status has been achieved and becomes established, it 
remains promising from both the economic and political points of view. In 
contrast to the attractiveness of this situation for governments of newly 
industrializing countries, the demand for potential new hub airports is 
diminishing. Therefore, the financial and political risks of achieving the hub 
function increase. If a developing country’s government decides to liberalize 
the national aviation market, airline and airport development should be co-
ordinated. Regulatory requirements for potential airport investors to develop 
an airport into a hub are of limited value to both, the national economy and 
the investor. A stabile hub operation at these airports can only be achieved, 
when the national carrier based at the airport benefits financially from a hub-
and-spoke network structure. If this situation can be realized, positive effects 
will be achieved for both the local aviation players and for the region. 
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